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Explaining Compliance with International Agreements against the Trafficking of
Children
Abstract
The sexual exploitation of children is detrimental to the physical and emotional health and development
of the children and undermines the development and growth of nations. Since 1989 the international
community has taken serious legislative steps to attempt to eliminate child sex trafficking. However,
despite nearly universal ratification of international conventions on the topic, the sexual exploitation of
children continues. The literature that addresses regime compliance suggests two general explanations
for the lack of follow-through among signatory countries: a lack of capacity (both political and economic)
and cultural proximity. This paper will examine the validity of each of these categories through analysis of
data across sixty-seven countries drawn from diverse regions. This study finds that political capacity,
followed by economic capacity, better accounts for compliance with child sex trafficking conventions
than measures of cultural proximity.

This article is available in Res Publica - Journal of Undergraduate Research: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/
respublica/vol12/iss1/6

Res Publica

45

Explaining Compliance with International
Agreements against the Trafficking of
Children
Allison A. Bannerman
Abstract
The sexual exploitation of children is detrimental to the physical and emotional
health and development of the children and undermines the development and growth of
nations. Since 1989 the international community has taken serious legislative steps to
attempt to eliminate child sex trafficking. However, despite nearly universal ratification
of international conventions on the topic, the sexual exploitation of children continues.
The literature that addresses regime compliance suggests two general explanations for
the lack of follow-through among signatory countries: a lack of capacity (both political
and economic) and cultural proximity. This paper will examine the validity of each of
these categories through analysis of data across sixty-seven countries drawn from
diverse regions. This study finds that political capacity, followed by economic capacity,
better accounts for compliance with child sex trafficking conventions than measures of
cultural proximity.
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That children require special protection has long been recognized. This unique
need was first internationally acknowledged in 1924 with the Geneva Declaration of the
Rights of the Child, which “ egulates[es] that mankind owes to the Child the best that it
has to give…and must [protect the Child] against every form of exploitation” (1924).6
Since then many international conventions have recognized that the vulnerability and
impressionability of childhood create a special need, and have created specific legislation
to address it. The relevant legislation includes the 1924 League of Nations Geneva
Declaration of the Rights of the Child, the 1948 United Nations (UN) Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the 1959 UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child, the
1966 UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the UN
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights from the same year.7 In the area of
sexual exploitation of children the most notable of these conventions are the UN 1989
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 1999 International Labor Organization (ILO)
Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the
Worst Forms of Child Labor (Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention), and the 2002
UN Optional Protocol on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child
prostitution and child pornography. Each of these three conventions includes specific
prohibitions against sexual exploitation and abuse with regard to prostitution, sex
trafficking and sex tourism. However, despite the nearly universal ratification of each of
these conventions, little is being done to improve the horrendous conditions in many of
the ratifying countries.

6
7

See Appendix A for definitions.
See Appendix B for more details.
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Children around the world are being used in ways that no adult should ever
tolerate. Because of the illegal and generally taboo nature of the subject there are few
reliable statistics that can give specific numbers of children being sexually exploited.
However, stories such as that of Nayla from Azerbaijan keep emerging.8
Azerbaijan/UAE: After her father died when she was 9, Nayla was given
to an orphanage. But her mother took her from the orphanage and sold her
to traffickers who brought her to Dubai. She was prostituted in clubs in
Dubai until she was 13 years old. After the Dubai police discovered her
illegal status, Nayla was deported back to Azerbaijan. Once she returned
to Azerbaijan, she was prostituted for three more years before becoming
pregnant. She contracted AIDS either in Dubai or in Baku and gave birth
to an HIV-positive baby last year. (Trafficking in Persons Report 2006)

This story is just one of many. Each of these exploited children have their childhood,
their freedom and their chance at life taken away from them. Many are left with sexually
transmitted diseases, including AIDS, as Nayla was. This is a national and a transnational
issue which needs to be universally addressed to be effectively halted. Children are often
taken across borders to where regulation of prostitution is less strict, or to countries that
are known sex tourism destinations. Nayla’s story demonstrates the lack of effective
treatment that these countries’ justice systems give the issue. Instead of Nayla’s
traffickers being brought to justice when her illegal status in the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) was discovered, Nayla was simply deported and returned to Azerbaijan where her
exploitation continued.9 This aspect of her story is by no means unique. Many of the
countries with a high incidence of child exploitation actually prosecute or deport the
children who are being exploited. This does nothing to reduce the problem but rather

8

Name changed by the Trafficking in Persons Report 2006.
Azerbaijan has ratified all three of the relevant conventions and UAE has ratified both
the 1999 ILO Convention and the 1989 UN Convention.
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exacerbates it, as the traffickers will simply find and bring in a new child while the one
deported, who has known only exploitation and has had no opportunity to improve his or
her life, will have nothing to turn to but back to what they know.
Many countries say on paper that they agree the problem is outrageous and
promise to take steps to halt this exploitation, but then do little or nothing. This paper will
attempt to explain differences in the level of compliance with child exploitation
conventions cross-nationally. It will begin by examining the general literature on regime
compliance and then draw hypotheses relevant to noncompliance with international child
sex trafficking conventions. These hypotheses will then be tested with data drawn from
international values surveys, fact books, and non-profit organizations. These results will
then be analyzed and conclusions drawn as to what can explain this worrying lack of
compliance and what might be done to improve compliance in the future.

Explaining Compliance
Compliance
Much of the literature on compliance tends to be sociological in nature. It
generally focuses on varying theories regarding how to enforce compliance (Dai 2005;
Heyns and Viljoen 2001; Hirsch 2005; Hurd 1999; May 2004; Neubauer and Kastner
1969; Pollis 1996; Renteln 1988 and 2005; Tallberg 2002). These studies have broken
compliance theory down into two main debates; the realist-liberal debate and the
management-enforcement debate. The realist-liberal debate stems from the neorealist
school of thought, which purports that compliance is best secured through coercion,
versus the rationalist-neoliberal school of thought, which believes that compliance is
secured through the self-interest of the participant. Both schools are based on the
acknowledged concept that there are three well-established methods of social control
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which each stem from one of three general reasons why a player might comply with a law
or standard; (1) coercion stemming from a fear of the punishment inflicted upon
disobedience, (2) self-interest stemming from a belief that compliance will benefit ones
self and (3) legitimacy which stems from a belief that the law or standard is legitimate
and therefore should be obeyed on its own merits (Hurd 1999).
The management-enforcement debate, on the other hand approaches the
explanation of compliance from a prevention versus

remediation

angle. The management

school insists that a problem-solving technique which focuses on remedying problems—
such as lack of capacity, differing or mistaken interpretations of laws/standards, and
greater governmental transparency—which aggravate noncompliance is the most
successful means.
While this paper addresses the issue of why countries do not comply with
international regimes rather than how to obtain greater compliance, this sociological
literature can still point toward a couple of general approaches to the relevant question.
Within this literature are hints—often only implied by the suggested solutions to the lack
of compliance problem—at what factors cause countries to comply (or not) with
international conventions. Peter May, for example, suggests;
Compliance with regulations is far from automatic for a variety of
reasons… egulates may not know about regulatory requirements, may
not agree with them, may not be capable of complying with them, may
find it too costly to comply, or simply may not care (1999).
These ideas break down into two general approaches: capacity and cultural proximity.

The Capacity Approach
Springing from the management-enforcement debate comes the idea that it is
because of a lack of political and/or economic capacity that these problem countries are
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not able to comply with the international conventions they say they support. Proponents
of the management school believe that states have every intention of complying with
international regimes to which they sign on, but it is because of “political and economic
capacity limitations” (Tallberg 2002, 613) that they do not comply.
This idea is reinforced in the general literature about the problem of sex
trafficking and exploitation. Factors such as “poverty, the attraction of perceived higher
standards of living elsewhere, lack of employment opportunities, organized
crime…government corruption [and] political instability” (Trafficking in Persons Report
2006) are commonly mentioned in these sources. These factors are indicative of such
capacity failures as are mentioned by the sociological authors.
Not only do these factors further noncompliance at a governmental level, but they
further the problem of trafficking itself, which then makes it even more difficult for these
governments to comply. An often cited example of this will be referred to as the “golden
opportunity principle”. This expresses the idea that the situation, often economic, in these
noncompliant countries is so unbearable that “many of the…victims view [their
trafficker] as a savior rather than a trafficker of human lives” (Renteln 2005, 61). Often,
the literature points out, sexually exploitive acts are not actually a culturally desired or
even accepted practice but are only viewed as such because of the frequency with which
a blind eye is turned. This, rather than reflecting the culture of the country, reflects the
exceedingly harsh conditions in which these people live their lives. These suffering
people sometimes see these exploitative actions as a way of bringing money and through
to relieve themselves and their fellow countrymen. As Renteln says; “sex slavery and

Res Publica

51

forced labor, are not valued cultural traditions, but reflect the desperation on the part of
families” (2005).
The literature also proposes a factor of pride associated with capacity limitations.
It has been suggested that governments will “resist international supervision and are
reluctant to implement recommendations and views” (Heyns and Viljoen 2001, 517)
because they are jealous of their sovereignty. This issue is further exacerbated when the
international culture is at odds with local traditions and practices. The general literatures
also cite many sources which are cultural in nature as contributing factors to
incompliance. This leads to the second approach that is hinted at in the sociological
literature; the cultural proximity approach.

The Cultural Proximity Approach
Cultural relativism is now being emphasized as extremely important to the
understanding of compliance motivations (Fellmeth 2000; Pollis 1996; Renteln 1988 and
2005). Preference as a reason for noncompliance has been said often to be caused by a
lack of connection to the ideals supported by the international regime. When compliance
with the international regime requires major changes in either/both beliefs or behaviors,
there is less likelihood that a country will comply. In other words, the countries whose
belief structures and actions begin at the farthest point from those pushed by international
regimes will remain the most distant because these countries have farther to go and less
incentive to do so. This idea is reflected in the “depth-of-cooperation hypothesis”
discussed by Tallberg. This hypothesis theorizes that noncompliance rises with the degree
of behavioral and legal change required to attain compliance. Therefore, “varying
adjustment pressures…translate into varying degrees of compliance” (2002). This
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supports the idea that international legislation—such as that addressing child sexual
exploitation—likely will not impact its target countries, because the behavioral and legal
changes required would be much greater than in those already close to compliance.
Often these conflicting traditional practices are not seen as harmful and are even,
in some cultures or contexts, considered beneficial. For example, child marriage is often
thought to give the child a better life while alleviating some of the financial burden on
their family. These children are often given away with only their best interests in their
parents and communities’ hearts. However, “violence, exploitation, and abuse may be
tolerated or encouraged in the form of child marriage” (Landgren 2005, 232). These
awful results are often not seen in communities from which the child has been taken since
often the child has no way to communicate with their family. Because of this, many of
the local communities do not know how dangerous and detrimental the practice can be.
The fostering of children—sending children from their family to work for a wealthier
family in exchange for an education—is a similar practice and situation. Often the child
is forced to work as a slave with none of the promised education given to them. Both of
these practices, besides being injurious to a protective environment for children in and of
themselves, also open the door for sex traffickers to easily steal children by simply
posing as marriage prospects or a potential family (Trafficking in Persons Report 2006).
Often practices that are intended to uphold cultural values are some of the most
formidable challenges to compliance.

Combination
Many specific factors that are suggested throughout the various literatures draw
from both of these approaches. For example, public knowledge and discussion has been
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suggested by several authors (Landgren 2005; Harris-Short 2003; Heyns and Viljoen
2001) as a key factor influencing compliance. This public knowledge and public
discussion, however, draws its source not from either of the singular approaches but from
both. Culturally, these “issues which permeate child protection [such as sex and
violence], are frequently taboo for public and even private discussion” (Landgren 2005,
223). The public feels more comfortable simply ignoring the problem and hoping it will
go away, which of course it will not until it is actively addressed. The public is not alone
in holding blame for lack of discussion, though. The government, either because of
embarrassment—related to the capacity issue of pride that was discussed earlier—or
because of economic gains for the country, or even simply because of personal greed and
corruption, ignores the problem as well.10 In addition to their ignorance, they keep the
public in the dark by refusing to disseminate this important information which could fuel
public discussion and through it change in the way children are protected. Even when the
national government does pass legislation meant to protect children it backfires because
the government refuses to broach the subject in the public discourse. As Landgren states;
“Legislation passed in isolation from a national debate and broader engagement can push
practices underground, as well as generating backlash” (2005).
This example of public discussion is just one of many factors which offer
explanation through both capacity and proximity approaches. Not only are single factors
often explained by both approaches, but it is nearly universal in the non-sociology based
literature that a combination of factors are cited when reasons for noncompliance are

10

“Protection abuses, or more precisely their public airing, can be felt as nationally
humiliating and their official acknowledgement may be slow in coming” (Landgren 2005,
228).
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discussed. The sociological literature would likely agree that it is a combination of factors
that can explain noncompliance. However, it is from this sociological literature that
separate approaches are laid out. This paper will use the two approaches given by
sociology, and break them into individual specific factors suggested by the literature on
sex trafficking within these categories.

Hypotheses
Based on the approach the literature takes, it is logical to break the hypotheses
into three sections. The political capacity section will address predictions regarding how
the political capacity of a nation will affect its compliance with international conventions
regulating child sex trafficking. The economic capacity section will do the same, looking
at economic factors. The cultural proximity section will attempt to measure attitudes and
see how these various factors play into compliance. The following three sections will lay
out what exactly are the hypotheses tested in this paper.

Political Capacity
The political capacity hypotheses contain a single general hypothesis followed by
two more specific hypotheses, the confirmation of which would show the confirmation of
the general hypothesis. The general hypothesis is based on the logical conclusions drawn
from the literature and can be related as follows:
H1: The level of government compliance with international conventions
on the sexual exploitation and trafficking of children is positively correlated with
high political capacity of the government.
This general hypothesis leads to implied hypothesis, H1.1, which addresses corruption, a
widely recognized key factor affecting political capacity. It seems obvious that the more
corrupt a nation’s government, the lower the political capacity of the country and
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therefore, based on H1, the less compliant with international regimes on child sex
trafficking. Therefore, H1.1 can be summarized as the following:
H1.1: Level of corruption in the national government is negatively
correlated with the level of government compliance with international regulations
on sexual exploitation of children.
The second more specific hypothesis, H1.2, deals with the legitimacy of the
governments of these various nations. It, like the previous, is drawn from a seemingly
logical assumption, in this case that the more legitimate a government, the more
compliant it will be with international regimes. This hypothesis is stated as follows.
H1.2: Increases in the legitimacy of the national government will be
positively correlated with increases in the level of government compliance with
international regulations on the sexual exploitation of children.

Economic Capacity
The economic capacity hypotheses are in much the same format as the political
capacity section, but include three more specific hypotheses which attempt to address the
general hypothesis rather than only two. In this section the general hypothesis is:
H2: The level of government compliance with international conventions
on the sexual exploitation and trafficking of children is positively correlated with
high economic capacity of the country.
This hypothesis is drawn from theorizing that countries with lower economic capacity
will have more motivation to ignore signs of child sex trafficking because they need the
income that can be brought in by such trade. The first more specific hypothesis, H2.1,
specifically looks at this theory through the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Per Capita of
each case country. GDP – per capita is an effective measure of economic capacity, as it
directly reflects the amount of money that a country has. H2.1 is based on the same
reasoning as the general economic capacity hypothesis, and is stated as follows:
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H2.1: The GDP – per capita (PPP) will positively correlate with the level
of compliance with international conventions on the sexual exploitation and
trafficking of children.
The second more specific hypothesis, H2.2, takes this same reasoning again but
this time uses the unemployment rate of the nation as a measure of economic capacity.
This is justified as a proper measure based on how the opinion of the public can influence
government compliance, especially when a government is legitimate. While GDP works
to measure motivation of the national government to comply, unemployment rate can
measure motivation of the general public to accept the exploitation of children when they
otherwise would not. When many people cannot get legitimate legal employment, they
will be more likely to engage in illegal practices to bring in income, such as child sex
trafficking. Because of this reasoning, H2.2, is as follows:
H2.2: Increases in the unemployment rate will negatively correlate with the
level of compliance with international conventions on the sexual exploitation and
trafficking of children.
The final specific economic capacity hypothesis addresses the same issue and
uses the same reasoning as H2.2. The percent of the population living below the poverty
line is used instead of the unemployment rate, but can arguably be used as a very similar
measure. Therefore, H2.3 is very similar to H2.2 and is stated as follows:
H2.3: The greater the percentage of the population below the poverty line,
the less a country will be compliant with the international conventions on the
sexual exploitation and trafficking of children.
While both these final two hypotheses are being used mainly to examine the motivations
of the general public, it must be kept in mind that both also encompass the economic
motivations of the government. This is because the economic interests of the population
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often coincide with those of the government, since everyone is relatively better off with
more money flowing through the country.

Cultural Proximity
The general cultural proximity hypothesis stems from the idea that the more
culturally congruent a nation’s traditions and values are with the presiding, and arguably
western, international regime the easier it is for the country to comply. Therefore, this
general hypothesis is stated as follows:
H3: The traditions and cultural attitudes of the people toward factors
related to sexual exploitation of children influence government compliance with
international regulations more than the international views expressed in these
regulations.
The first of the three more specific hypotheses deals with the liberality of national
attitudes toward issues such as gender equality and sexuality. Since most of those
exploited are girl children, it is believed that a more liberal view of female empowerment
would positively correlate with a stricter view on the sexual exploitation of children. As
for sexuality, the more liberal the general attitude toward sexual freedom, the more likely
it is that there will be an active discussion of the issues surrounding sex trafficking, and
with discussion come solutions and action. This hypothesis stems from the basic idea that
the more open a people and government are, the more responsive the government will be
to human rights violations such as child sex trafficking. Because of the previous
reasoning H3.1 proposes the following:
H3.1: Countries with more liberal attitudes toward female empowerment
and sexuality will be more compliant with international conventions on the sexual
exploitation of children.
The second specific hypothesis is very similar to the first, but instead deals with
how conservative the nation’s attitude is toward prostitution. The logic is that the less

Res Publica

58

approval there is of prostitution, the more likely the public would be to support
legislation minimizing prostitution and through it the sexual exploitation of children. This
leads to H3.2 which is:
H3.2: Countries with more conservative attitudes toward prostitution will
be more compliant with international conventions on the sexual exploitation of
children.
The final specific hypothesis deals with the value a country places on female
children. The logic behind this hypothesis is the same as that of female empowerment in
H3.1. Because girl children are more often exploited and trafficked, it seems overtly
logical that the less a country values these little girls, the less they will be protected and
the harder this attitude will be to change, and it must be changed for the relevant
legislation to be enforced. Because of this reasoning, H3.3 is as follows:
H3.3: Countries which place little value on female children will be less
compliant with international regulations on the sexual exploitation of children.

Research Design and Methodology
The research reported in this paper follows a comparative cross-national research
design involving sixty-seven cases from around the world. The data used to test the
hypotheses were gathered from a variety of statistical and/or academic sources which
were analyzed to draw conclusions on the previously stated hypotheses.

Case Selection
To identify the factors that account for varying levels of compliance with
international conventions on the sexual exploitation of children, it is necessary to include
cases from different geographical regions, levels of socio-economic development and
cultures. Further criteria for inclusion consist of: (1) the country must have ratified the
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three key conventions that deal with the sex trafficking of children (the 1998 UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Optional Protocol added to the previous Act in
2000, and the 1999 ILO Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention); (2)
the country must be identified as a democratic state by the CIA World Factbook; (3) each
case must have/had at least some direct experience with child sex trafficking as reported
in the U.S. State Department Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP) which requires that
included countries be “… determined to be countries of origin, transit, or destination for a
significant number of victims of severe forms of trafficking” (2006); and finally (4) there
has to be available and comparable data across the range of variables. After going
through the list of possible cases and cutting those that did not meet the criteria, sixty
seven cases were left.11
Table 1 - Regions

Number of
cases

Africa

Asia

Central
America

Eastern
Europe

South
America

SubSaharan
Africa

4

11

8

13

9

15

Western
Europe
7

Dependent Variable: Compliance
The dependent variable in this study is the compliance of a country with
international conventions regarding the sexual trafficking and exploitation of children.
This variable is measured through the recoding of a three tier system from TIP. TIP
reports from 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 were used. The TIP does not base
its ratings on compliance with the three international conventions this paper examines;
rather it uses a U.S. Public Law called the Trafficking in Victims Protection Act of 2000

11

See Appendix D for a complete regional list.
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(TVPA).12 Section 108 of this Act lays out specific “Minimum Standards for the
Elimination of Trafficking” which are what the TIP uses as its measure of compliance.13
The minimum standards are directly comparable with the requirements of the three major
conventions on child sex trafficking; therefore it serves as a valid measure .
The TIP bases its tier placement on the following criteria:
1) The extent to which the county is a country of origin, transit, or
destination for severe forms of trafficking; 2) The extent to which the
government of the country does not comply with the TVPA’s
minimum standards and, in particular the extent of the government’s
trafficking related corruption; and 3) The resources and capabilities of
the government to address and eliminate severe forms of trafficking in
persons.

While the third criterion may, at first glance, seem to be the same as economic capacity
or political capacity, this is not the case. While the variables used in this study use direct
measures of corruption, legitimacy, GDP, rate below the poverty line and unemployment
to test these capacity issues, none of these are even mentioned in the individual country
narratives which the TIP says “explains the basis for rating a country as Tier 1, Tier 2,
Tier 2 Watch List, or Tier 3” (2006). Rather, when the TIP references resources and
capabilities, it speaks only of what resources the government has dedicated to the fight
against the sex trafficking of children and what resources they should dedicate. Because
of this it is not felt that this criterion conflicts with either category of hypotheses.
From the tier placement criteria, the countries the TIP addresses are broken into
four categories: Tier 1 includes countries which comply fully with the minimum
standards of the TVPA; Tier 2 countries’ governments do not yet fully comply with the

12
13

Pub. L. No. 106-386.
See Appendix C for complete Minimum Standards directly from the TIP 2006.
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TVPA minimum standards but have been making “significant efforts” (31) (emphasis
added) to comply fully; Tier 2 Special Watch List (Tier 2W) includes countries which
would fall into the criteria for Tier 2 but about which the TIP has concerns based on a)
the increasing level of trafficking, b) lack of evidence of increasing effort to combat
trafficking, and/or c) future commitments to further steps are the only real basis for
placement in Tier 2 in the first place; Tier 3 is the final category and includes countries
whose governments do not fully comply with TVPA Minimum Standards and are making
insignificant, if any, efforts to bring themselves into compliance. It is worth noting that
these tiers were not determined based solely on the self-reporting of a country. Because
of issues of exaggeration or flat-out lying, the TIP put little weight on the statements of
the governments, but rather focuses on “the concrete actions governments have taken to
fight trafficking, especially prosecutions, convictions, and prison sentences for
traffickers, victim protection, and prevention efforts” (2006). The report does not take
indirect efforts—such as education programs—into account when making these tier
placements, though the report does acknowledge the benefit such programs can have.
For use as a measurement device in this paper, these tiers were recoded into a sixpoint scale. A country was given the ranking of
Graph 1 - Compliance Distribution

6 if it had been consistently ranked Tier 1 by the

5%
10%

TIP or had moved up to Tier 1 from a lower
tier.14 A country was considered a 5 if it had
risen in rank to Tier 2 from a lower rank and
was considered a 4 if it had been pretty

14

28%
1
2
3
4
5
6

14%

See Appendix E for Tables of the distribution for each variable.19%

24%
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consistently Tier 2. A country was coded a 3 if it had dropped to Tier 2 from Tier 1 or if
it had risen to Tier 2W from Tier 3. A coding of 2 represents a country which has
dropped to Tier 2W from a higher tier or the country has been almost consistently Tier
2W. The lowest number, 1, was awarded to countries that have been consistently Tier 3
or have dropped to Tier 3 from any of the higher categories.

Independent Variables
The independent variables included in this study were broken down into the same
three categories as the hypotheses: 1) political capacity, 2) economic capacity and 3)
cultural proximity.
Political Capacity Variables
The political capacity factors include corruption and legitimacy. These capture the
greatest problems affecting political capacity and therefore accurately measure the effect
this approach has on compliance. Corruption is measured with the rankings from the
2005 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) compiled by Transparency International, a self
described “global civil society organization” (Tranparency.org). The CPI is created based
on assessments made by experts in the field and by opinion surveys done in each of the
countries which are used to self-assess the problem. The CPI scale ranges from 10
representing no corruption and 1 representing extreme corruption, these numbers were
then coded directly into the dataset used in this study.
The measure of legitimacy came from the 2006“Freedom in the World” ratings by
Freedom House, a widely recognized expert on freedom in countries around the world
which produces this “annual comparative assessment of the state of political rights and
civil

liberties

in

192

countries

and

14

related

and

disputed

territories”
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(freedomhouse.org).15 Freedom House gives each country a rating of “Free”, “Partially
Free” or “Not Free”. For the purposes of this study these numbers were coded so that any
country rated by Freedom House as “Free” was coded as 3, a ranking of “Partially Free”
was given a 2, and those that were said to be “Not Free” were given a 1.
Economic Capacity Variables
Economic capacity variables are also meant to capture the capacity of the
government, though this time in the economic arena. These variables include GDP-Per
Capita (PPP), the percent of the population living below the poverty line and the
unemployment rate. These measures effectively capture economic capacity, as a
government with higher economic capacity would be better able to provide for their
citizens, which would lower both the unemployment rate and the rate of people below the
poverty line. It is also assumed that the higher the GDP-Per Capita, the higher the
economic capacity of the country.
Each of these three variables are measured with numbers taken from the 2006
version of The World Factbook created by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). GDP –
Per Capita (PPP) shows the GDP divided by the population (in the 2006 World Factbook
this number is taken as of July 1, 2006) thereby showing the GDP per person at the
purchasing power parity (PPP) level, which means at the prevailing United States (US)
dollar exchange. The number was taken from the World Factbook and divided by 1000
and then coded into the dataset of this study.
The unemployment rate represents the percentage of the labor force—typically,
those of working age who are seeking employment—that are not employed. The
15

Chad and Costa Rica are exceptions to this. The numbers to measure these two
countries came from the 2005 ratings as the 2006 numbers were not available.
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percentage of people living below the poverty line is estimated through “surveys of subgroups, with the results weighted by the number of people in each group” (cia.gov). The
poverty line itself fluctuates from country to country, as richer nations typically use
“more generous standards of poverty than poor nations” (cia.gov). The measures of
population below the poverty line and unemployment rate with both given in percentages
so these numbers were coded directly into the dataset.
Cultural Proximity Variables
The final category is cultural factors. In this study, culture is measured by
attitudes of the public towards prostitution, underage sex, female empowerment and girl
children. The gender attitudes are included because the great majority of those trafficked
are female, and especially girl children. These specific attitudinal variables are felt to
encompass traditional values which will likely differ from country to country, though
more especially from region to region. The selected variables are those which will likely
have a direct impact on how the public of a country view the issue of sex trafficking and
other sexual exploitation of children.
The level of female empowerment in this study is measured with the Human
Development Reports’ 2005 Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM). This measure is
created by “measuring gender inequality in three basic dimensions of empowerment—
economic participation and decision-making, political participation, and decision-making
and power over economic resources” (hdr.undp.org). The GEM uses four measures to
capture these dimensions: seats held by women in parliament; female legislators, senior
officials and managers; female professional and technical workers; and the female to
male ratio of estimated earned income. The GEM gives countries a value of 0 to 1; the

Res Publica

65

closer the value is to 1 the more empowered the women of that country are said to be.
The number assigned to each country was then directly coded into the dataset for this
study.
The attitudes toward prostitution, underage sex, sexual freedom and girl children
were all measured with questions from the World Values Surveys (WVS) and the
European Values Surveys (EVS) from 1981-2004, a dataset that combines seven total
surveys. From this dataset, this survey used four individual questions. The first, question
D024, measures attitudes toward sexual freedom; “If someone said that individuals
should have the chance to enjoy complete sexual freedom without being restricted, would
you tend to agree or disagree?” After running frequencies for each case on SPSS, the
valid percent of respondents that answered “disagree” was coded directly into this study’s
dataset. The next question, D025, was used to measure attitudes toward girl children: “If
you were to have only one child, would you rather have it be a boy or a girl?” SPSS
frequencies were again run, and this time the valid percentage that answered that they
would prefer a boy child was entered.
The questions measuring attitudes toward prostitution and underage sex, F119 and
F135 respectively, were the same question with only the active phrase being different.
Specifically the question read: “Please tell me for each of the following statements
whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified or something in between”.
“Prostitution” and “sex under the legal age of consent” were two of the statements. For
both of these questions, SPSS was run and the valid percent that answered “Never
Justifiable” was entered into this study’s dataset.
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Findings and Analysis
This section will report and analyze the results uncovered through empirical
analysis. Bivariate correlations were run to test the strength and directionality of the
relationship between each independent variable (corruption, legitimacy, GDP-Per Capita
(PPP), percent below the poverty line, unemployment rate, female empowerment, sexual
freedom, value placed on boy children, justifiability of prostitution, and justifiability of
underage sex) and the dependent variable (compliance). These tests also determined the
statistical reliability of each finding. The results found that, in general, the directionality
of the results was consistent with the proposed hypotheses. There were, however, some
exceptions that went opposite to the direction predicted. These exceptions will be
discussed in detail under the section in which they arise.

Political Capacity
The political capacity factors proved to be the most statistically significant
grouping as well as the pair with the strongest correlations. Corruption was extremely
significant (as can be seen in Table 2) and also held the strongest relationship of any
Table 2 – Political Capacity Results
Expected
Correlation Significance
Direction
Coefficient
(1-tailed)
N
Corruption
positive
0.335*
0.003*
66
Legitimacy
positive
0.208*
0.046*
67
** = significant at the .01 level
* = significant at the .05 level

results

at

0.335.

Since the measure
of corruption used

in the Corruption Perceptions Index approaches 10 as corruption decreases, and the
measure of compliance created for this study approaches 6 as compliance rises, a positive
correlation would be the expected result of the bivariate testing. Therefore, this finding of
0.335 confirms H1.1, that as corruption rises, the level of government compliance with
international regulations on sexual exploitation of children decreases.
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Legitimacy was not far behind corruption with statistical significance at the .05
level and a relatively strong correlation of 0.208. Again, this correlation is in the expected
direction, as the Freedom House legitimacy rankings were coded, in this study, from 3
representing a rating of “Free” to 1 representing a ranking of “Not Free”. This finding
then confirms H1.2, that increases in the legitimacy of the national government will be
positively correlated with increases in the level of government compliance with
international regulations on the sexual exploitation of children.
With both of these hypotheses confirmed, it is easy to determine that the general
hypothesis regarding political capacity—H1: The level of government compliance with
international conventions on the sexual exploitation and trafficking of children is
positively correlated with high political capacity of the government—is confirmed. This
affirmation, in turn, demonstrates, part of what the literature has theorized. The
comparative strength and reliability of this result emphasizes the importance that political
factors play in the level of compliance a country maintains.

Economic Capacity
The economic capacity hypotheses were also confirmed, but in general were less
robust and less reliable than the political capacity. The failing statistical significance of
these
likely

tests

is

because

of the reduced
N, a problem
that will plague

Table 3 - Economic Capacity Results
GDP - Per
Capita (PPP)
Unemployment
Rate
Percent Below
Poverty Line
** = significant at

Expected
Direction

Correlation
Coefficient

Significance
(1-tailed)

N

positive

0.277

0.012

66

negative

-0.145

0.142

56

negative
the .01 level

-0.123

0.189
54
* = significant at the .05 level

this study even more during the attitudinal tests. As can be seen in Table 3, when the N is
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reduced, even only by 10 cases, the statistical significance significantly worsens.
However, the statistical significance is not so bad that indications of results cannot still be
claimed.
As seen in Table 3, the results for GDP – Per Capita (PPP) are statistically
significant reaching almost the 0.01 level. This, partnered with a correlation of 0.277
confirms H2.1, that GDP – per capita (PPP) will positively correlate with the level of
compliance. Unemployment rate and poverty line are much shakier but do suggest
confirmations of the hypotheses H2.2 and H2.3. While neither is statistically significant or
has particularly strong directionality, both do run in the expected negative direction. It
was expected that these variables would both show a negative relationship to compliance
because rises in both the percentage of people living below the poverty line and of
persons unemployed represent increased poverty. It seems logical that the poorer the
people of a country are, the more likely they would be to allow for any income
possible—and unfortunately sexually exploiting children can bring income into a
country—which would mean less compliance with international regulations on these
possible incomes.
Overall, this study finds that the general hypotheses—H2: The level of
government compliance with international conventions on the sexual exploitation and
trafficking of children is positively correlated with high economic capacity of the
country—regarding economic factors is confirmed. This also confirms what the literature
suggests and leads to the examination of the final aspect that the literature suggests would
affect compliance with international conventions on the sexual exploitation and
trafficking of children, cultural proximity factors.
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Cultural Proximity
The tests of cultural proximity provided, by far, the least statistically significant
results. This, as stated earlier, is likely because the N for these tests is so significantly
lower.

Little

attitudinal data were
available for these
countries

from

many international
surveys
However,

examined.
even

Table 4 - Cultural Proximity Results
Gender
Empowerment
Value Sexual
Freedom
Value Boy
Children
Prostitution
Never Justified
Underage Sex
Never Justified
** = significant at

Expected
Direction

Correlation
Coefficient

Significance
(1-tailed)

N

positive

0.268

0.055

37

positive

-0.032

0.43

34

negative

-0.313

0.053

28

positive

-0.238

0.072

39

positive
the .01 level

0.199

0.187
22
* = significant at the .05 level

these insignificant results can generally suggest the directionality of the relationship
between the variables. The exception to this is the measure of sexual freedom.
The relationship between the value of sexual freedom and compliance came back
at -0.032. While against the expected direction, the weakness of this correlation was not
surprising. It was difficult to determine whether this variable should be expected to have
a negative or positive relationship with compliance in the first place. This is because
either direction could be justified, which likely explains at least in part why the
relationship is so weak. To justify an expected positive direction, it must be believed that
a country with more sexual freedom would be more open to discussion of the topic of
child sexual exploitation. Through discussion, it has been widely recognized, come
solutions. Therefore, because of the openness of sexuality, solutions to the tragic problem
of exploitation can be formed. On the other hand, it could be argued that countries more
accepting of deviant sexual behavior would be more accepting of sex with children and
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because of this, of exploitation. This leads to the variable of justifiability of sexual
relations under the age of consent, which actually turns out to suggest disproval of this
theory, by showing that where it is felt that sex under the age of consent is never justified,
there is greater compliance with international conventions on the sexual exploitation and
trafficking of children.
As seen in Table 4, the measure of approval of underage sex came back with a
relationship of 0.199 and a statistical significance of 0.187. While this is not extremely
reliable, it suggests a relationship that would likely be confirmed if the N could be raised
above the very low number of 22. This relationship was in the expected direction, which
was not surprising. It seems fundamentally logical that countries in which the people
approve less of underage sex will be more stringent with the regulation of underage sex,
and through regulation, more compliant with the conventions on the sexual exploitation
and trafficking of children. The other expectation that seemed fundamentally logical,
however, went in the completely unexpected direction. This was the measure of attitudes
toward prostitution.
It was expected that countries in which the people approved less of prostitution
would be more compliant with the relevant international conventions. This was assumed
simply because the sexual exploitation and trafficking of children is linked so
fundamentally with prostitution. However, though a positive relationship was expected,
the results returned a correlation of -0.238 with a reliability of 0.072. While not
technically significant, it is quite close to being significant at the 0.05 level, and
regardless of the significance, it is an arguably strong relationship. This finding was
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extremely surprising and no reasons for it jump to mind. Therefore, it is felt that this
variable requires further study to try to explain this result.
The final two cultural proximity variables—value on male children and gender
empowerment—both fell in the expected directions and had a statistical significance of
0.053 and 0.055 respectively. They both had very strong relationships with compliance,
with the value of male children bringing in the second strongest number with -0.313 and
gender empowerment coming in fourth with 0.268. It was believed that the value placed
on male children would be negatively correlated with compliance, since girls are much
more often sexually exploited. Conversely, it was expected that female empowerment
would positively correlate with compliance.
Overall, it appears that the general hypothesis—H3: The traditions and cultural
attitudes of the people toward factors related to sexual exploitation of children influence
government compliance with international regulations more than the international views
expressed in these regulations—regarding cultural proximity as a factor was confirmed,
even though H3.2—that countries with more conservative attitudes toward prostitution
will be more compliant with international conventions on the sexual exploitation of
children—was apparently refuted.

Conclusions
My original research question addressed what factors affected the compliance of a
country with international conventions on the sexual exploitation and trafficking of
children. The literature suggested that political and economic capacity and cultural
proximity of the nation played a role. The results reported in this paper seem to confirm
these suggestions. However, some results were weak, insignificant or surprising. This
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opens the door for future research examining cases that may be exceptions to the general
rule. It would be interesting to research these specific cases in more detail, and perhaps
uncover why these exceptions occur. There is also, of course, the ever-present hope that
previously unfound data will appear and make the already tested variables have more
reliable results. In addition, there are more factors—such as the practice of child
fostering, child labor standards of the individual countries, and the amount of public
discussion and the availability of information on this topic individual level—that these
results suggest may also figure in to compliance. These questions will, it is hoped, be
answered with further research.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Definitions
- Child: Defined in the legislation as either 1) under 18 years of age or 2) pre-pubescent.

This study defines a child anyone under 18 years of age, as do the three international
conventions this study focuses on.
- Sex Trafficking: “The recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of

a person for the purpose of a commercial sex act” (TIP 2006).
- Child Prostitution: “The use of a child in sexual activities for remuneration or any

other form of consideration” (Optional Protocol 2000).

Appendix B: The Conventions
-

Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child: Adopted by the League of
Nations September 26, 1924.
- Principle 4: “The child must be put in a position to earn a livelihood, and
must be protected against every form of exploitation”

-

Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Adopted by the UN December 10,
1948.
- Article 25 Section 2: “Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special
care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall
enjoy the same social protection.”

- Declaration of the Rights of the Child: Adopted by the UN November 20, 1959.
- Preamble: “The child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity,
needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection.”
- Principle 2: “The child shall enjoy special protection, and shall be given
opportunities and facilities, by law and by other means, to enable him to
develop physically, mentally, morally, spiritually and socially in a healthy
and normal manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity. In the
enactment of laws for this purpose, the best interests of the child shall be
the paramount consideration.”
- Principle 9: “The child shall be protected against all forms of neglect,
cruelty and exploitation. He shall not be the subject of traffic, in any form.
The child shall not be admitted to employment before an appropriate
minimum age; he shall in no case be caused or permitted to engage in any
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occupation or employment which would prejudice his health or education,
or interfere with his physical, mental or moral development.”
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Adopted by
the UN on December 16, 1966.
- Article 10 Section 3: “Special measures of protection and assistance
should be taken on behalf of all children and young persons without any
discrimination for reasons of parentage or other conditions. Children and
young persons should be protected from economic and social exploitation.
Their employment in work harmful to their morals or health or dangerous
to life or likely to hamper their normal development should be punishable
by law. States should also set age limits below which the paid employment
of child labour should be prohibited and punishable by law.”

-

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Adopted by the UN on
March 23, 1976.
- Article 24 Section 1: “Every child shall have, without any discrimination
as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin,
property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as are required
by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.”

-

Convention on the Rights of the Child: Adopted by the UN on November 20,
1989.
-

-

-

-

Article 11: “1. States Parties shall take measures to combat the illicit
transfer and non-return of children abroad. 2. To this end, States Parties
shall promote the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements or
accession to existing agreements.”
Article 34: “States Parties undertake to protect the child from all forms of
sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. For these purposes, States Parties
shall in particular take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral
measures to prevent: (a) The inducement or coercion of a child to engage
in any unlawful sexual activity; (b) The exploitative use of children in
prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices; (c) The exploitative use of
children in pornographic performances and materials.”
Article 35: “States Parties shall take all appropriate national, bilateral and
multilateral measures to prevent the abduction of, the sale of or traffic in
children for any purpose or in any form.”
Article 36: “States Parties shall protect the child against all other forms of
exploitation prejudicial to any aspects of the child’s welfare.”
Article 39: “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote
physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child
victim of: any form of neglect, exploitation, or abuse; torture or any other
form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; or armed
conflicts. Such recovery and reintegration shall take place in an
environment which fosters the health, self-respect and dignity of the
child.”
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-

Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention: Adopted by the ILO on June 17,
1999.
- Article 3 Sections a, b and d: “For the purposes of this Convention, the
term the worst forms of child labour comprises: (a) all forms of slavery or
practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children,
debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, including
forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict; (b)
the use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the production
of pornography or for pornographic performances; (d) work which, by its
nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the
health, safety or morals of children.”
- Article 7 (especially Section e): “1. Each Member shall take all necessary
measures to ensure the effective implementation and enforcement of the
provisions giving effect to this Convention including the provision and
application of penal sanctions or, as appropriate, other sanctions. 2. Each
Member shall, taking into account the importance of education in
eliminating child labour, take effective and time-bound measures to: (a)
prevent the engagement of children in the worst forms of child labour; (b)
provide the necessary and appropriate direct assistance for the removal of
children from the worst forms of child labour and for their rehabilitation
and social integration; (c) ensure access to free basic education, and,
wherever possible and appropriate, vocational training, for all children
removed from the worst forms of child labour; (d) identify and reach out
to children at special risk; and (e) take account of the special situation of
girls.”

-

Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of
children, child prostitution and child pornography: Adopted by the UN on
May 25, 2000.

-

-

-

Article 1: “States Parties shall prohibit the sale of children, child
prostitution and child pornography as provided for by the present
Protocol.”
Article 2: “For the purposes of the present Protocol: (a) Sale of children
means any act or transaction whereby a child is transferred by any person
or group of persons to another for remuneration or any other
consideration; (b) Child prostitution means the use of a child in sexual
activities for remuneration or any other form of consideration; (c) Child
pornography means any representation, by whatever means, of a child
engaged in real or simulated explicit sexual activities or any representation
of the sexual parts of a child for primarily sexual purposes.”
Article 3: “1. Each State Party shall ensure that, as a minimum, the
following acts and activities are fully covered under its criminal or penal
law, whether such offences are committed domestically or transnationally
or on an individual or organized basis: (a) In the context of sale of children
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as defined in article 2: (i) Offering, delivering or accepting, by whatever
means, a child for the purpose of: a. Sexual exploitation of the child; b.
Transfer of organs of the child for profit; c. Engagement of the child in
forced labour; (ii) Improperly inducing consent, as an intermediary, for the
adoption of a child in violation of applicable international legal
instruments on adoption; (b) Offering, obtaining, procuring or providing a
child for child prostitution, as defined in article 2; (c) Producing,
distributing, disseminating, importing, exporting, offering, selling or
possessing for the above purposes child pornography as defined in article
2. 2. Subject to the provisions of the national law of a State Party, the
same shall apply to an attempt to commit any of the said acts and to
complicity or participation in any of the said acts. 3. Each State Party shall
make such offences punishable by appropriate penalties that take into
account their grave nature. 4. Subject to the provisions of its national law,
each State Party shall take measures, where appropriate, to establish the
liability of legal persons for offences established in paragraph 1 of the
present article. Subject to the legal principles of the State Party, such
liability of legal persons may be criminal, civil or administrative. 5. States
Parties shall take all appropriate legal and administrative measures to
ensure that all persons involved in the adoption of a child act in
conformity with applicable international legal instruments.”

Appendix C: Trafficking Victims Protection Act
“TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION ACT — MINIMUM STANDARDS
FOR THE ELIMINATION OF TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Div. A of Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 108, as
amended.

(I)

Minimum standards

For purposes of this chapter, the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking
applicable to the government of a country of origin, transit, or destination for a significant
number of victims of severe forms of trafficking are the following:
2. The government of the country should prohibit severe forms of trafficking in
persons and punish acts of such trafficking.
3. For the knowing commission of any act of sex trafficking involving force, fraud,
coercion, or in which the victim of sex trafficking is a child incapable of giving
meaningful consent, or of trafficking which includes rape or kidnapping or which
causes a death, the government of the country should prescribe punishment
commensurate with that for grave crimes, such as forcible sexual assault.
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4. For the knowing commission of any act of a severe form of trafficking in persons,
the government of the country should prescribe punishment that is sufficiently
stringent to deter and that adequately reflects the heinous nature of the offense.
5. The government of the country should make serious and sustained efforts to
eliminate severe forms of trafficking in persons.
(B) Criteria

In determinations under subsection (a)(4) of this section, the following factors should be
considered as indicia of serious and sustained efforts to eliminate severe forms of
trafficking in persons:
1. Whether the government of the country vigorously investigates and prosecutes
acts of severe forms of trafficking in persons, and convicts and sentences persons
responsible for such acts, that take place wholly or partly within the territory of
the country. After reasonable requests from the Department of State for data
regarding investigations, prosecutions, convictions, and sentences, a government,
which does not provide such data, consistent with the capacity of such
government to obtain such data, shall be presumed not to have vigorously
investigated, prosecuted, convicted or sentenced such acts. During the periods
prior to the annual report submitted on June 1, 2004, and on June 1, 2005, and the
periods afterwards until September 30 of each such year, the Secretary of State
may disregard the presumption contained in the preceding sentence if the
government has provided some data to the Department of State regarding such
acts and the Secretary has determined that the government is making a good faith
effort to collect such data.
2. Whether the government of the country protects victims of severe forms of
trafficking in persons and encourages their assistance in the investigation and
prosecution of such trafficking, including provisions for legal alternatives to their
removal to countries in which they would face retribution or hardship, and
ensures that victims are not inappropriately incarcerated, fined, or otherwise
penalized solely for unlawful acts as a direct result of being trafficked.
3. Whether the government of the country has adopted measures to prevent severe
forms of trafficking in persons, such as measures to inform and educate the
public, including potential victims, about the causes and consequences of severe
forms of trafficking in persons.
4. Whether the government of the country cooperates with other governments in the
investigation and prosecution of severe forms of trafficking in persons.
5. Whether the government of the country extradites persons charged with acts of
severe forms of trafficking in persons on substantially the same terms and to
substantially the same extent as persons charged with other serious crimes (or, to
the extent such extradition would be inconsistent with the laws of such country or
with international agreements to which the country is a party, whether the
government is taking all appropriate measures to modify or replace such laws and
treaties so as to permit such extradition).
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6. Whether the government of the country monitors immigration and emigration
patterns for evidence of severe forms of trafficking in persons and whether law
enforcement agencies of the country respond to any such evidence in a manner
that is consistent with the vigorous investigation and prosecution of acts of such
trafficking, as well as with the protection of human rights of victims and the
internationally recognized human right to leave any country, including one’s own,
and to return to one’s own country.
7. Whether the government of the country vigorously investigates, prosecutes,
convicts, and sentences public officials who participate in or facilitate severe
forms of trafficking in persons, and takes all appropriate measures against
officials who condone such trafficking. After reasonable requests from the
Department of State for data regarding such investigations, prosecutions,
convictions, and sentences, a government which does not provide such data
consistent with its resources shall be presumed not to have vigorously
investigated, prosecuted, convicted, or sentenced such acts. During the periods
prior to the annual report submitted on June 1, 2004, and on June 1, 2005, and the
periods afterwards until September 30 of each such year, the Secretary of State
may disregard the presumption contained in the preceding sentence if the
government has provided some data to the Department of State regarding such
acts and the Secretary has determined that the government is making a good faith
effort to collect such data.
8. Whether the percentage of victims of severe forms of trafficking in the country
that are non-citizens of such countries is insignificant.
9. Whether the government of the country, consistent with the capacity of such
government, systematically monitors its efforts to satisfy the criteria described in
paragraphs (1) through (8) and makes available publicly a periodic assessment of
such efforts.
10. Whether the government of the country achieves appreciable progress in
eliminating severe forms of trafficking when compared to the assessment in the
previous year.” (TIP 2006)
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Appendix D: Cases
Cases by Region
Africa

Asia

Central
America

Eastern
Europe

South
America

Saharan
Africa

Western
Europe

Egypt

Azerbaijan

Belize

Argentina

Angola

Austria

Morocco

Bangladesh

Costa Rica

Belarus
Bosnia and
Herzegovina

Bolivia

Denmark

Sudan

Japan

El Salvador

Bulgaria

Brazil

Tunisia

Kazakstan

Guatemala

Croatia

Chile

Chad
Congo, Dem.
Republic
Equatorial
Guinea

Kyrgyzstan

Honduras

Estonia

Columbia

Madagascar

Norway

Lebanon

Mexico

Lithuania

Ecuador

Mali

Portugal

Mongolia

Nicaragua

Macedonia

Paraguay

Mauritius

Spain

Philippines

Panama

Poland

Peru

Mozambique

Uruguay

Niger

Syria

Romania
Serbia and
Montenegro

Turkey

Slovakia

Senegal

Slovenia

South Africa

Ukraine

Tanzania

South Korea

Rwanda

Togo
Uganda

France
Italy
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Appendix E: Variable Distribution

Table 5 - Compliance Breakdown
Code
6
5
4
3
2
1

# of Countries
11
13
29
2
9
3

Table 7 - Legitimacy Breakdown
Number of
Countries
Code
3
34
2
22
1
11

Table 6 - Corruption Breakdown
Number of
Countries
Code
9 to 10
1
8 to 9
2
7 to 8
4
6 to 7
3
5 to 6
3
4 to 5
9
3 to 4
16
2 to 3
25
1 to 2
4

Table 8 - GDP Breakdown
Number of
Countries
Code
0 - 4.9
27
5 - 9.9
17
10 - 14.9
9
15 - 19.9
3
20 - 24.9
2
25 - 29.9
3
30 - 34.9
3
35 - 39.9
0
40 - 44.9
1
45 - 49.9
0
50 - 54.9
1
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Table 9 - Unemployment Breakdown
Number of
Countries
Code
0 - 4.9
9
5 - 9.9
21
10 - 14.9
13
15 - 19.9
6
20 - 24.9
1
25 - 29.9
2
30 - 34.9
1
35 - 39.9
1
40 - 44.9
0
45 - 49.9
2

Table 10 - Poverty Line Breakdown
Number of
Countries
Code
0 - 4.9
3
5 - 9.9
9
10 - 14.9
9
15 - 19.9
7
20 - 24.9
2
25 - 29.9
5
30 - 34.9
2
35 - 39.9
3
40 - 44.9
3
45 - 49.9
4
50 - 54.9
2
55 - 59.9
0
60 - 64.9
2
65 - 69.9
0
70 - 74.9
2
75 - 79.9
1
80 - 84.9
1

Table 11 - GEM breakdown
Number of
Countries
Code
0.900 - 1.000
1
0.800 - 0.899
0
0.700 - 0.799
2
0.600 - 0.699
7
0.500 - 0.599
14
0.400 - 0.499
8
0.300 - 0.399
2
0.200 - 0.299
3
0.100 - 0.199
0
0.000 - 0.099
0

Table 12 - Sex. Freedom Breakdown
Number of
Countries
Code
5 - 9.9
1
10 - 14.9
1
15 - 19.9
2
20 - 24.9
0
25 - 29.9
1
30 - 34.9
2
35 - 39.9
4
40 - 44.9
6
45 - 49.9
3
50 - 54.9
2
55 - 59.9
1
60 - 64.9
3
65 - 69.9
2
70 - 74.9
2
75 - 79.9
2
80 - 84.9
1
85 - 89.9
1
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Table 13 - Value Girls Breakdown
Number of
Countries
Code
15 - 19.9
3
20 - 24.9
1
25 - 29.9
9
30 - 34.9
9
35 - 39.9
6
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Table 14 - Prostitution Breakdown
Number of
Countries
Code
40 - 44.9
5
45 - 49.9
2
50 - 54.9
2
55 - 59.9
6
60 - 64.9
3
65 - 69.9
8
70 - 74.9
6
75 - 79.9
1
80 - 84.9
2
85 - 89.9
1
90 - 94.9
2
95 - 100
1

